KAPSNER, Justice.
[¶ 1] Sandy Mangelsen appeals from a district court order finding he is a sexually dangerous individual and committing him to the care, custody, and control of the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services. We affirm, concluding the district court did not err in finding the State established by clear and convincing evidence that Mangelsen is a sexually dangerous individual.
[¶ 2] Mangelsen's first sexual offense occurred in South Dakota in August 2005, when he was 18 years old. Mangelsen touched the breast of a 13-year-old girl over her clothes, and touched the thigh and held hands with a 14-year-old girl. As a result, Mangelsen was convicted of sexual contact with a child under the age of 16 and received a suspended sentence.
[¶ 3] Mangelsen's second sexual offense occurred in North Dakota in 2007, when he was 20 years old. Mangelsen kissed on the mouth and touched the buttock of a 14-year-old girl. Mangelsen was convicted of gross sexual imposition and sentenced to five years imprisonment with four years suspended. While incarcerated, Mangelsen successfully completed a low intensity sex offender treatment program.
[¶ 5] Prior to Mangelsen's scheduled release from incarceration, the State filed a petition seeking to commit him as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. A commitment hearing was held on January 4, 2013. The district court found that Mangelsen is a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) and ordered him committed to the care, custody, and control of the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services.
[¶ 6] Mangelsen contends on appeal that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is a sexually dangerous individual.
[¶ 7] Before a person can be civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3, the State must establish four elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the individual has engaged in sexually predatory conduct; (2) the individual has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; (3) the condition makes the individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others; and (4) the individual has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. In re Hehn, 2013 ND 191, ¶ 8, 838 N.W.2d 469; In re Whitetail, 2013 ND 143, ¶ 5, 835 N.W.2d 827; In re Voisine, 2010 ND 17, ¶ 9, 777 N.W.2d 908; N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8). We review civil commitments of sexually dangerous individuals under a modified clearly erroneous standard, and we will affirm the district court's order unless it is induced by an erroneous view of the law or we are firmly convinced that the order is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re Johnson, 2013 ND 146, ¶ 5, 835 N.W.2d 806.
[¶ 8] In reviewing the district court's order, we give great deference to the court's credibility determinations of expert witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, because the trial court is the best credibility evaluator in cases of conflicting testimony. In re J.M., 2013 ND 11, ¶ 8, 826 N.W.2d 315. A claim that the district court improperly relied upon the opinion of one expert instead of another challenges the weight the evidence was assigned, not the sufficiency of the evidence. Whitetail, 2013 ND 143, ¶ 5, 835 N.W.2d 827; In re J.T.N., 2011 ND 231, ¶ 8, 807 N.W.2d 570. Because the evaluation of credibility where evidence is conflicting is solely a trial court function, this Court will not reweigh expert testimony nor second-guess the credibility determinations made by the trial court in sexually dangerous individual proceedings. J.T.N., at ¶ 8. A choice between two permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not clearly erroneous. Id.; In re Wolff, 2011 ND 76, ¶ 14, 796 N.W.2d 644.
[¶ 9] Mangelsen's primary contention on appeal is that the State failed to
[¶ 10] The fourth element of the commitment standards evolved in response to substantive due process concerns, as expressed in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412-13, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002), as a corollary to the third statutory-based element of the test. Voisine, 2010 ND 17, ¶ 9, 777 N.W.2d 908. We explained the requirements of this constitutionally based component of the sexually dangerous individual test in J.M., 2013 ND 11, ¶ 7, 826 N.W.2d 315 (citation omitted):
[¶ 11] Mangelsen argues the State failed to satisfy the due process component because it did not prove he had exhibited conduct demonstrating he has serious difficulty controlling his sexual behavior. Mangelsen contends there must be evidence specifically showing a continued difficulty in controlling sexual behavior to warrant civil commitment under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3.
[¶ 12] This Court, however, has expressly rejected the argument that the conduct demonstrating serous difficulty in controlling behavior must be sexual in nature:
Wolff, 2011 ND 76, ¶ 7, 796 N.W.2d 644.
[¶ 13] The district court based its finding that Mangelsen had serious difficulty controlling his behavior on some instances of sexual conduct and some instances of non-sexual conduct. The court also considered conflicting testimony presented by the two expert witnesses, Dr. Lisota for the State and Dr. Ertelt for Mangelsen. Dr. Lisota diagnosed Mangelsen with Paraphilia NOS (Polymorphous Perverse), Polysubstance Dependence, Antisocial Personality Disorder, and Borderline Intellectual Functioning. Dr. Lisota opined that Mangelsen's disorders resulted in serious difficulty controlling his behavior. Dr. Ertelt diagnosed Mangelsen with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, Alcohol Dependence, Impulse Control Disorder, Adult Antisocial
[¶ 14] The district court found that Dr. Lisota's testimony was more credible and supported a finding that Mangelsen had serous difficulty controlling his behavior and was likely to engage in further sexually predatory conduct. We give great weight to the court's credibility determinations, J.M., 2013 ND 11, ¶ 8, 826 N.W.2d 315, and we do not reweigh expert testimony or second-guess credibility determinations made by the trial court in sexually dangerous individual proceedings. J.T.N., 2011 ND 231, ¶ 8, 807 N.W.2d 570.
[¶ 15] The district court fully explained the rationale for its finding that Mangelsen's conduct demonstrated serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. The court noted:
[¶ 16] The court ultimately found that Mangelsen had demonstrated serious difficulty controlling his behavior, satisfying the fourth element of the sexually dangerous individual test:
[¶ 17] Applying our limited standard of review, we conclude the district court's findings that Mangelsen had exhibited serious difficulty in controlling his behavior and that he is a sexually dangerous individual are not clearly erroneous.
[¶ 18] In his brief on appeal, Mangelsen repeatedly references the fact that his prior sexual convictions involved "low level" sexual offenses, implying that an individual who has committed only low level offenses should not be deemed a sexually dangerous individual subject to civil commitment under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. The commitment of sexually dangerous individuals is a statutorily created procedure, and the legislature has adopted a broad definition of "sexually predatory conduct," the initial triggering point for civil commitment under the statute. See N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(9). In his written closing argument following the commitment hearing, Mangelsen expressly conceded "that the State has shown by clear and convincing evidence that he has engaged in sexually predatory conduct, as evidenced by previous convictions." On appeal, Mangelsen does not argue that his prior convictions did not constitute sexually predatory conduct under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(9). Accordingly, no issue is presented on this appeal questioning whether Mangelsen engaged in sexually predatory conduct under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(9).
[¶ 19] Although arguments might be made that the civil commitment provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3 should not apply to individuals who have committed only low level sexual offenses, those arguments are more appropriately addressed to the legislature, not the judiciary. See Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 2001 ND 139, ¶ 29, 632 N.W.2d 407. This Court's function is to interpret the statute as written by the legislature, and "[t]he justice, wisdom, necessity, utility and expediency of legislation are questions for legislative, and not for judicial determination." Id. (quoting Stokka v. Cass Cnty. Elec. Coop., Inc., 373 N.W.2d 911, 914 (N.D.1985)). It is for the legislature, not the courts, to identify and determine the public policy of the state. Estate of Christeson v. Gilstad, 2013 ND 50, ¶ 14, 829 N.W.2d 453; Rodenburg, at ¶ 29.
[¶ 20] We have considered the remaining issues and arguments raised by the parties and find them to be either unnecessary to our decision or without merit. We affirm the order committing Mangelsen to the care, custody, and control of the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services.
[¶ 21] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., MARY MUEHLEN MARING, S.J., DANIEL J. CROTHERS and DALE V. SANDSTROM, JJ., concur.
[¶ 22] The Honorable Lisa Fair McEvers was not a member of the Court when this case was heard and did not participate in this decision. Surrogate Judge Mary Muehlen Maring, sitting.
SANDSTROM, Justice, concurring.
[¶ 23] Because of the sparse treatment of Mangelsen's sexually predatory conduct in the Majority opinion, I believe it helpful to recite the district court's findings here:
[¶ 24] I agree the district court did not err in finding the State established by clear and convincing evidence that Mangelsen is a sexually dangerous individual.
[¶ 25] Dale V. Sandstrom.
